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THE LOGIC OF EMPIRICAL THEORIES REVISITED 
 
Johan van Benthem, Amsterdam & Stanford, http://staff.science.uva.nl/~johan 
 
Abstract Logic and philosophy of science  share a long history, though contacts have gone 
through ups and downs. This paper is a brief survey of some major themes in logical studies of 
empirical theories, including links to computer science and current studies of rational agency. 
The survey has no new results: we just try to make some things into common knowledge. 
 
1  A very brief history of logic and philosophy of science  
 
Looking at famous 19
th century authors, it is often hard to separate what we would now 
call  logicians  from  philosophers  of  science.  Bolzano’s  Wissenschaftslehre  (Bolzano 
1837) is mainly a classic in logical inference, while Mill’s famous work A System of 
Logic (Mill 1843) is mainly a classic of scientific methodology. Likewise, Helmholtz’ 
theory of transformations and invariants in the foundations of the empirical sciences 
(Helmholtz 1868), linked to the psychology of perception, reached mathematics, deeply 
influencing the logical study of definability. But at the end of the 19th century, things 
changed. Modern logic underwent an ‘agenda contraction’ toward the foundations of 
mathematics: just compare the small set of concerns in Frege’s Begriffsschrift (Frege 
1879) as a model for the field of logic with the Collected Papers of his contemporary 
Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce 1933): a rich mixture of formal and informal themes, 
from common sense reasoning to science, that is still being mined today. 
1  
 
The foundational turn made mathematics the paradigm for logical method (which it still 
is) and also the major field of investigation for those methods. Even so, a new brand of 
philosophers  of  science  soon  picked  up  on  the  new  developments,  and  in  the  20
th 
century, too, many major philosophers contributed to both areas, such as Carnap, Beth, 
Lewis,  Hintikka,  or  van  Fraassen.  The  main  insights  and  techniques  from  the 
foundational phase concern mathematical proof and formal systems. But in the 1930s, 
members  of  the  Vienna  Circle  and  other  groups  turned  these  modern  tools  to  the 
empirical sciences as well, with Reichenbach and Popper as famous examples. Interests 
                                                 
1 While we still celebrate Frege as our founding father (whose limited channel of concerns gave the 
current of his thoughts torrential force), Peirce’s wide range seems closer to the scope of logic today.   2   
went both ways, and e.g., Carnap also played a role in logical discussions at the time 
(van Benthem 1978A). Logical methods still dominated ‘neo-positivism’ in the 1950s.  
 
This marriage came under attack from several sides around 1960. The external criticism 
of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962) seemed to show that 
logic  paints  a  largely  false  picture  of  the  reasoning  underlying  actual  practice  and 
progress in science. Added to this, influential internal critics like Suppes observed that 
the formal language methodology of logic is irrelevant to scientific practice, where one 
goes  for  the  relevant  structures  with  any  symbolism  at  hand,  by-passing  ‘system-
generated issues’ like first- versus higher-order languages that logicians delight in. 
2 
 
Contacts did not break off, and ‘philosophical logic’ kept many themes alive, such as 
conditional reasoning and causality, that meander through logic and the philosophy of 
science. But through the 1970s, logic became friends with disciplines where languages 
do play a central role, in particular, computer science and linguistics. 
3 Simultaneously, 
many philosophers of science defected to probabilistic methods. Contacts between the 
fields atrophied – and sometimes, even a certain animosity could be observed.  
 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, however, many themes have emerged that are shared 
again  between  the  two  fields,  often  with  a  new  impetus  from  a  shared  interest  in 
computation. I will discuss a number of these and earlier themes in this paper, and show 
how a new liaison may be in the air. My emphasis will be, not on shiny new logic tools 
that philosophers of science should use, but more symmetrically, on shared interests.   
 
2  The logical structure of scientific theories 
 
What logicians call a ‘theory’ can be as stark as a set of sentences X in some formal 
language, or much more roughly, abstracting away from details of syntax, the matching 
                                                 
2 Logic did enter ‘structuralism’ later in the celebrated work of Sneed 1971, and even much more so in 
the work of Pearce & Rantala 1983 on a variety of abstract logics for analyzing scientific theories. 
3 Probably the bulk of logic research today is at the interface with computer science, broadly conceived.   3   
class of models MOD(X). 
4 Sometimes one gets a richer ‘computational’ view with a 
deductive apparatus: axioms, inference rules, a notion of provability |–, and theorems. 
5  
 
With a few exceptions, this operational aspect has played little role in contacts between 
logic and philosophy of science, 
6 that have focused on pure syntactic-semantic aspects. 
But after new contacts with computer science since the 1980s, computational influences 
have emerged, with sometimes surprising parallels across fields (van Benthem 1989). 
 
Calculus of theories and inter-theory relations An early interface was the ‘calculus of 
theories’ in the Warsaw School in the 1930s, by Tarski and his students. Mathematics 
involves a web of formal theories, connected by algebraic operations, but also simple 
relations like extension, or sophisticated ones like relative interpretation. And the same 
is of course true for the empirical sciences, though inter-theory relations are much more 
varied there. In particular, there is a rich tradition of notions of ‘reduction’ between 
empirical theories, many of them related to logic (cf. Kuipers 2000). Reductions have to 
do with the integrated architecture of science, but also help consolidate its growth. 
 
Empirical and theoretical vocabulary A masterful historical survey of formal notions 
of ‘scientific theory’ is in Suppe 1974, and we only mention a few high-lights. One of 
the earliest proposals for using a modern semantic conception of theory in the study of 
empirical sciences like physics is Beth 1948. A richer syntactic-semantic picture of a 
scientific theory occurs in Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, Quine 1951, with a hierarchical 
architecture of theoretical laws, empirical regularities, and plain observed facts. 
7  
 
Crucial to this picture is a division not found in mathematical theories, namely, between 
observational  and  theoretical  vocabulary.  The  former  refers  to  directly  observable 
phenomena,  the  latter  superimposes  theoretical  notions  that  unify  the  theory,  and 
provide its computational power. Logical results were used to analyze this, such as the 
result by Craig & Vaught 1958 that any recursively axiomatizable set of observational 
                                                 
4 An intermediate-level compromise is the association of the set X with a semantic family {MOD(ϕ) | 
ϕ∈X}. Van Benthem 2005 has a discussion of this notion and its role in current methodological debates. 
5 This is a computational ‘operational’ aspect, and in modern settings, this even gets broadened. A useful 
logical system comes with algorithmic procedures for key tasks such as checking for truth of formulas in 
a model, finding models for given formulas, or comparing models for structural similarities. 
6 Cf. Mittelstaedt 1978 on logical-operational views of measurement in terms of Lorenzen dialogues. 
7 In applications, there are also the standard ‘auxiliary assumptions’ that scientists tend to make.   4   
sentences can be given a finite axiomatization by adding new theoretical predicates 
(describing, say, the innards of some enumerating Turing machine). On the semantic 
side, the pioneering book Przelecki & Wojcicki (cf. Przelecki 1969) turned this into the 
following simple picture. As opposed to a mathematical theory, an empirical theory 
comes  with  two  disjoint  vocabularies:  L0  and  Lt,  and  two  classes  of  structures  are 
relevant: those whose similarity type matches L0, and richer structures for the complete 
language L0 + Lt. 
8 Axioms of the theory T(L0, Lt) can be purely within the component 
languages, or they are ‘bridge principles’ between empirical and theoretical vocabulary. 
 
With this two-level picture, an old debate in the philosophy of science enters logic, viz. 
the ontological status of the theoretical terms. Do these denote independent entities and 
predicates – or are they mere fictions to oil the wheels of the theory, that might in 
principle be eliminated by definition? The famous proposal by Ramsey in the 1920s (cf. 
Ramsey 1960) is that an empirical theory T states an existential second-order claim 
about  L0-structures  M  (standing  for  the  empirical  situations  that  satisfy  our  current 
data): there exist predicates interpreting the theoretical language Lt such that the whole 
theory T is true on the model M expanded with the new predicates. Syntactically, with 
tuples  of  observational  predicates  P  and  theoretical  Q,  the  ‘Ramsey  sentence’  of  a 
theory ϕ(P, Q) is the second-order formula ∃Q. ϕ(P, Q). This makes sense. By basic 
logic, any pure P-sentence that follows from ϕ(P, Q) also follows from ∃Q. ϕ(P, Q).  
 
This simple picture suggests many logical questions (cf. the survey van Benthem 1982). 
We give some examples, to show how philosophy of the empirical sciences and logical 
model theory can meet in fruitful ways. For a start, the ‘empirical content’ of a first-
order theory T has often been cast as being the models of its Ramsey sentence, or 
equivalently, the restricted model class MOD(T)|L0. What is the connection between 
this notion and the set T|L0 of all L0-consequences of T: the theory’s ‘empirical part’ in a 
more syntactic sense? (One can think of the latter as the empirical facts and regularities 
currently known in T.)  It is easy to see that the following inclusion holds:  
 
MOD(T)|L0 ⊆ MOD(T|L0).  
 
When the converse inclusion 
 
MOD(T|L0) ⊆ MOD(T)|L0  
                                                 
8 Purely for convenience, we will assume henceforth that these languages have only predicates.   5   
 
holds,  i.e.,  the  situations  satisfying  our  empirical  knowledge  can  be  ‘explained’  by 
postulating  theoretical  superstructure,  we  say  that  the  theoretical terms  are ‘Ramsey 
eliminable’. But this converse does not always hold (van Benthem 1978B has a counter-
example) 
9 – and the most general result that pure logic has to offer is this:  
 
  For first-order theories T, each model M of T|L0 has an L0-elementary extension  
  to a model for T in its full language, i.e., a model M
+ with possibly new objects 
  where all tuples of M-objects still satisfy the same first-order formulas as in M.  
 
Thus, sometimes, to make a given empirical situation fall under a theory, we need to 
postulate not just new predicates (and functions), but also new objects. 
10  
 
But there is much more to the logic empirical theory interface. For instance, as we said 
earlier, one striking theme in the empirical sciences are transformations and invariance. 
11 Then a natural take on the status theoretical terms in a theory T might be that they 
‘supervene’ on the observational vocabulary in the following sense:  
 
  If two models of the theory have an ‘empirical’ L0-isomorphism f linking them, 
  then f is automatically an isomorphism w.r.t. the theoretical predicates in Lt.  
 
At least for first-order theories, Beth’s Definability Theorem then shows that this is 
equivalent to the existence, within T, of an explicit definition for the theoretical terms in 
terms of the observational vocabulary. 
12 Thus, this invariance criterion is much stronger 
than Ramsey eliminability, and theoretical terms would become mere abbreviations. 
Their main function might then be to direct our attention to specific patterns to study, 
and smoothening computations – just like defined concepts in mathematical theories. 
                                                 
9 One considers the first-order ordering theory T of the natural numbers (N, <) while adding a unary non-
empty predicate that is to be closed under taking immediate successors and predecessors. This theory is 
consistent, since it holds in all non-standard models of T, taking the predicate to hold of the ‘supernatural 
numbers’. But the natural numbers themselves cannot be expanded to a model of the whole theory. 
10 Demopoulos 2009 reviews the debate about theoretical terms in terms of these model-theoretic results. 
11 For an example, think of the crucial role of the Lorentz transformations in relativistic mechanics. 
12 As a special case, this implies implicit definability in Beth’s sense. Let a theory T(P, Q) have two 
models (D, P, Q), (D, P, Q’) on the same domain D with observational predicates P and theoretical Q, Q’. 
The identity map f on D is an isomorphism on the observational predicates, and hence it also respects the 
theoretical predicates. But that means that Q equals Q’. In an obvious version with tuples of predicates, 
Beth’s theorem then says that in T, the Q-predicates are all definable in terms of the P-predicates.    6   
 
The distinction between observational and theoretical vocabulary is relevant to logic in 
general. For instance, it has been suggested (van Benthem 1984) that ‘formal semantics’ 
is largely the art of finding theoretical terms explaining a given linguistic or inferential 
practice  –  with  the  usual  representation  proofs  underpinning  logical  completeness 
theorems serving as a sort of Ramsey elimination of these theoretical terms. 
13 Likewise, 
it has been claimed that in logics of agency, the only observable vocabulary concerns 
agents’ actions, while the ubiquitous notions of belief and preference are theoretical 
terms. Their role is to drive a simple theory of agency based on postulates of rationality 
as ‘going for maximal achievable gain, given one’s beliefs’. This is reminiscent of the 
way that theoretical predicates are added to empirical situations in mechanics, so as to 
satisfy Newton’s Laws, 
14 and thereby start a smoother process of computation. 
15 
 
Inter-theory relations But the model theory of empirical theories contains many further 
topics. One important theme in the philosophy of science has been comparison between 
theories, and given the richer structure discussed just now, this can take place in more 
ways than in mathematics, with various notion of reduction between theories. There has 
been little research on this topic in logic. An exception is van Benthem & Pearce 1984 
that provides a mathematical characterization of the notion of relative interpretability.
16 
The result extends earlier analyses of Tarski, Sczcerba and Makkai to prove that  
                                                 
13 Examples are modal accessibility relations and the usual matching Henkin-style completeness proofs.  
14 The analogy becomes particularly nice in versions of mechanics with shortest-path and least-effort. 
Minimization over suitable orderings is a ubiquitous logical pattern from common sense to science. 
15 See also van Benthem 2009A on some structural strategies for removing observed contradictions from 
bodies  of  opinion,  or from  scientific  theories,  going  back  to  Weinberger  1965.  Such  strategies  may 
introduce new ‘theoretical’ predicates adding argument positions to old predicates, or dividing objects 
into new groupings. The paper also discusses more conversational strategies that defuse contradictions by 
ascribing different beliefs to agents that are at odds. These, too, seem to involve theoretical terms, since 
we do not have direct observational access to the minds of people involved in a disagreement.  
16 For theories T, T’, this says there is a unary predicate A in the language of T’ and a translation τ of T-
predicates  into  possibly  complex  T’-predicates  such  that  T’  can  prove  ∃xAx  plus  the  syntactically 
relativized version (τ (T))
A, i.e., T with its predicates translated and relativized to the ‘submodel’ of T’-
objects satisfying A. A typical case is the relative interpretation of the theory of the natural numbers in set 
theory, with numbers as finite ordinals, and arithmetical predicates like < translated by set-theoretic ones 
like ∈. A more complex notion of is the interpretation of the theory of the rational numbers into that of 
the integers, taking rationals to be ordered pairs of integers, modulo some definable equivalence relation.   7   
 
  T is syntactically relatively interpretable in T’ iff there exists a functor F 
  sending T’-structures M to T-structures F(M) that respects isomorphisms 
  between models for the language of T’ and commutes with ultraproducts of  
  such models, where the domain of the model F(M) is contained in that of M. 
 
The authors relate this notion to structuralist (in Sneed’s set-theoretic sense) formats of 
reduction  in  the  philosophy  of  science.  There  is  also  interesting  work  of  Pearce  & 
Rantala 1983 on using non-standard models with infinite values for the velocity of light 
to analyze the ‘approximation’ relation between classical and relativistic mechanics – a 
common kind of relation that has no obvious counterpart in the mathematical realm.  
 
More  sophisticated  calculi  of  theories  that  care  about  different  levels  of  vocabulary 
occur in computer science. Van Benthem 1989 observes how theories of abstract data 
types  with  ‘visible’  and  ‘hidden’  vocabulary  reflect  the  above  issues  of  Ramsey 
eliminability – while the so-called ‘module algebra’ of Bergstra, Heering & Klint 1990 
is  a  sophisticated  account  of  modular  theory  structure  in  this  two-level  setting. 
17 
Indeed, this is just one instance where computer science meets with core issues in the 
philosophy of science. We will see a number of further parallels in the next section. 
18 
 
Foundations of specific theories But perhaps the major achievement in the foundations 
of mathematics has found few repercussions in the philosophy of the empirical sciences, 
namely,  the  sustained  study  of  specific  important  theories  by  meta-logical  means. 
Landmarks of the latter from the 1930s are Gödel’s Theorems on Peano Arithmetic, and 
Tarski’s analysis of ‘elementary geometry’ (Tarski 1959). These provided spectacular 
new insights into the expressive power and complexity of these systems, beyond what 
working mathematicians had realized by themselves. No similar spectacular results are 
known for theories in physics, such as mechanics. There has only been a small trickle of 
logical work on the foundations of causal space-time (starting with Robb 1914; cf. also 
van Benthem 1983 on the formal study of time alone), with topics described in various 
chapters of the Handbook of Spatial Logics (Aiello, Pratt-Hartman & van Benthem, 
eds., 2007), and also of ‘quantum logic’ (Dalla Chiara 1992). Only recently, a new 
                                                 
17 An early source here is Maibaum 1986 on logical interpolation theorems in structured programs. 
18  There  are  many  further  examples.  Doyle  1983  contains  a  discussion  showing  how  philosophical 
concerns in Die Logische Aufbau der Welt (Carnap 1928) returned naturally in Artificial Intelligence.   8   
wave of logical studies of the physical sciences seems to be emerging, witness Andréka, 
Madarász  &  Németi  2007  on  first-order  axiomatizations  of  the  special  and  general 
theory  of  relativity,  Baltag  &  Smets  2008A  on  dynamic  logics  of  information  and 
measurement  in  quantum  mechanics,  and  Abramsky  &  Coecke  2004  on  proof-
theoretic/computational methods in quantum information theory. 
 
3  The logical structure of scientific activities 
 
But many themes at the interface of logic and philosophy of science are not about static 
theory structure. They are rather about scientific activities, and that even at two levels. 
First, there is the ‘local dynamics’ of users engaged in scientific reasoning with some 
fixed background theory – but also, there is the ‘global dynamics’ of wholesale theory 
change as performed by the scientific avant garde. We list instances of both. 
 
Working with a theory: varieties of reasoning One striking feature of the literature in 
the philosophy of science has been the richer view of inferential activities (in a broad 
sense) that agents can involve in. For instance, in addition to merely drawing inferences 
from a theory, there is the process of confirming a given hypothesis from observed data. 
19 But maybe the more common type of scientific reasoning is the explanation of an 
observed fact, in terms of some hypothesis backed up by the theory. Explanation is 
much more than just deriving the observed data from the theory. Here is a simple sketch 
of what the ‘deductive-nomological model (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948) says about it. 
My version is just to illustrate some issues, leaving out some qualifications: 
 
  Hypothesis H explains evidence E given theory T if (a) T & H imply E, 
(b) T alone does not imply E, (c) H alone does not imply E. 
 
Several  features  of  this  notion  go  beyond  classical  logical  consequence.  First,  an 
inference of this sort is ternary, not binary: it involves not just premises and conclusion, 
but also the third ingredient of a background theory. 
20 Also, the structural properties of 
                                                 
19 For a survey of confirmation theory, induction, and related problems, cf. Vickers 2006. 
20 Interestingly, this richer format for what an inference really is bears strong resemblances to the analysis 
of argument in Toulmin 1958, that rejected modern logic, and later became a major source for modern 
‘argumentation theory’. In Toulmin’s set up, ‘data’ support a ‘claim’, with a ‘warrant’ supplying the 
bridge, which itself comes with a ‘backing’. Moreover, each conclusion has a ‘qualifier’ indicating its 
force,  a  feature  highly  reminiscent  of  the  varieties  of  conclusions  in  current  non-monotonic  logics.   9   
this notion are analogous to, but not identical with those of classical consequence. For 
instance, it is non-monotonic in both the T and H arguments: as opposed to the classical 
case, strengthening the theory or the hypothesis may clearly violate clauses (b) or (c).  
 
Thus, explanation is a non-classical notion of consequence, whose structural rules show 
some resemblance to the ‘non-monotonic logics’ that emerged in AI in the 1980s, and 
are still a major topic in current research. Such logics allow for valid inferences P ⇒ C 
from a set of premises P to a conclusion C that may fail for stronger premises P, R. The 
reason for this behaviour is often that one does not consider all models for the premises 
in testing for the conclusion, but just a subclass of ‘most relevant’ or ‘minimal’ ones in 
some ordering (McCarthy 1980). In AI, this was motivated by common sense problem 
solving, where we work with the most plausible scenarios only. But this restriction also 
fits well with the fact that much empirical reasoning in science has a (usually hidden) 
proviso of “under normal circumstances”. 
21 Monotonicity may then fail since minimal 




While these accounts have usually been cast as static relations between propositions, the 
way logicians used to do, confirmation and explanation are of course also dynamic 
activities of cognitive agents, and we will high-light this perspective as we go on. 
 
Further examples There are many more themes in scientific reasoning with a logical 
slant, and many crucially involve fine-structure of empirical theories. One example is 
the typical feature of scientific laws that they support counterfactual reasoning. If you 
                                                                                                                                               
Historically, transcending the simplistic format of standard logical inference went two ways then: that of 
HempelOppenheim  eventually  toward  richer  logics  and  more  expressive  languages,  that  of  Toulmin 
toward non-logical informal argumentation theory. It would be of interest to see if the two traditions can 
meet again. For instance, Toulmin’s emphasis on the role of ‘formalities’ (i.e., procedure) rather than 
‘form’ in reasoning sounds quite close to the recent dynamic perspectives on logic to be discussed below. 
21 My colourful high-school teacher in chemistry always told us that the main thing we should understand 
about chemistry was not its laws, but the meaning of the phrase “under normal circumstances” – since 
every law that he was going to teach us admitted of lots of exceptions.  
22 The study of confirmation Hempel 1965 even contains an explicit precursor of circumscription, the 
notion of non-monotonic logic that later became famous in AI through the work of John McCarthy 1980. 
23 Aliseda-Llera 2006 develops many further analogies between scientific reasoning styles and structural 
rules for non-classical consequence relations, with special attention to Peirce’s notion of abduction. Van   10   
had lit the match, an explosion would have occurred, even though you did not strike it. 
The laws of physics guarantee that conclusion – again, ‘under normal circumstances’: 
the usual qualification that distinguishes mathematical from ordinary certainty. But this 
link is just a beginning: philosophers of science have also tried, conversely, to describe 
the surplus of scientific laws over ‘accidentally true generalizations’ in terms of their 
counterfactual or modal nature. 
24 Van Benthem 2006 discusses this and other themes 
where logic and philosophy have a shared history, with topics crossing between fields, 
including linguistics, computer science or economics, before returning.  
 
Note also that, going back to an earlier topic, with a richer view of reasoning activities, 
a richer picture arises of a scientific theory: not just with layers of observational and 
theoretical vocabulary, but also in terms of organization of principles (cf. Quine 1951). 
The latter range from deeply entrenched core laws via modal ‘dispositional statements’ 
about empirical regularities to brute observed facts, all surrounded by a belt of working 
assumptions. Not surprisingly in the light of the following sections, this is also the sort 
of structure one finds in current logics of belief revision (cf. Rott 2007), where one’s 
beliefs may be less or more ‘entrenched’ and hence less or more sensitive to revision. 
Thus, our discussion returns in a natural way to global issues of theory structure. 
 
Developing a scientific theory One can come a long way using a given scientific theory 
to  explain  observed  facts,  especially,  since  one  can  invent  hypotheses  to  shield  the 
theory itself from being refuted. But sometimes, the pressure of reality becomes too 
great, and one wants to change the current theory itself. Theory change, too, is a major 
theme in the philosophy of science, and optimal ways of restructuring theories have 
been  widely  studied,  both  historically  and  systematically.  This  process  has  been 
emphasized  by  Popper,  who  claimed  that  science  learns  through  refutation  of  its 
conjectures, putting a premium on making bold claims, and learning by trial and error. 
There are various strands of investigation to this. One is the study of verisimilitude, 
where one tries to define when one theory is ‘closer to the truth’ than another (Zwart 
2002),  providing  an  assessment  of  the  rationality and  quality  of  scientific  progress. 
There are also strong connections with belief revision theory, as is clear in Gaerdenfors 
                                                                                                                                               
Benthem 2003 points at links with the various notions of consequence distinguished by Bernard Bolzano, 
and finds some complete sets of structural rules for these styles of reasoning.  
24 A famous ‘modal mechanics’ mixing physics and logic was developed in Bressan 1972.   11   
1988. A more computational strand is the use of notions and methods from formal 
learning theory in the study of scientific inquiry and theory change, with Kelly 1996 as 
a  pioneering  study.  Here,  ‘learners’  are  cast  as  computational  devices  that  produce 
hypotheses over time, when exposed to an evidence stream, and one tries to understand 
long-term convergence behaviour toward identification of correct theories of the world. 
Again, we see how logic, philosophy of science, and informatics form a natural unity. 
 
Digression: computational analogies As we have seen several times now, themes at the 
interface of logic and the philosophy of science have natural counterparts in computer 
science. The analogies noted with non-monotonic logic and belief revision are a case in 
point, linking to Artificial Intelligence. But there are also analogies with more standard 
computer science. For instance, ‘structured theories’ are important in the study of data 
bases and knowledge bases (Ryan 1992), and many further examples can be found. 
Even so, philosophers of science have had less to say on the fundamental function of a 
theory as a ‘computational device’ for problem solving. Still, by now, there is also a 
literature connecting the progress of science with computational learning mechanisms 
(cf. Osherson, Stob & Weinstein 1986, Glymour 1980, Bod 2006). Finally, the typical 
multi-agent systems view of modern computer science will emerge in the next section. 
 
4  Common sense and scientific agency 
 
For my final topic, I start with a personal perspective. The famous classic The Structure 
of  Science  (Nagel  1961)  explains  how  science  differs  from  ‘common  sense’,  in  its 
standards  of  rigour,  its  degree  of  organization,  and  many  other  features.  While  I 
assiduously learnt all these criteria by heart as a student, they now seem unconvincing 
to me – and largely based on ignorance of the delicate workings of common sense, that 
have only come to light in the work of logicians since the 1970s. 
25 I would now think 
that science is the exercise of certain qualities of our common sense reasoning, but 
taken further in isolation, and also importantly, simplified in that many subtle features 
of actual reasoning and communication are put out of play. Thus, contra Nagel, I think 
                                                 
25 Rereading early philosophers of science I am struck by their uncritical idealized views of the rationality 
of ‘the scientist’, often coupled to equally unwarranted disdain for the stupidity of standard philosophers.   12   
that the border line between science and common sense is thin, and this seems a good 
thing to me: both for the unity of culture, and not to ‘let science get out of hand’. 
26 
 
In particular, I think it is worth-while to compare the agenda of philosophy of science 
with modern logics of rational agency and intelligent interaction (van Benthem 2010). 
This will change our perception of interfaces between the two areas. In my view, logic 
is about processes of information flow, and the intelligent activities supported by these.  
 
Diversity of information sources: observation on a par with inference For a start, as 
has been observed since the earliest days of logic, in the world of common sense, agents 
with  rational  skills  manipulate  at  least  three  major  sources  of  information,  namely, 
observation,  inference,  and  communication.  And  this  moves  us  with  one  great  step 
away from the pure mathematics paradigm of inference and proof as the norm for logic 
toward the reality of the empirical sciences, where observation is equally fundamental. 
27 Thus, by its very definition rather than some external motivation of ‘application’, 
logic moves from the a priori to the a posteriori as its topic, making empirical theories 
the paradigm to consider, rather than the very special case of mathematical theories.  
 
Indeed, the hard part to understand here may not be the logical rationale of observation, 
but rather the role of mathematical proof. Even though we all agree that this, too, plays 
an essential role in science, it is less easy to say in which precise sense valid proof steps 
generate information. In the philosophy of science, this has been a persistent problem: 
cf. Fitelson 2006 on the problem of explaining the informativeness of Einstein’s famous 
deductions from the General Theory of Relativity. This same ‘scandal of deduction’ has 
been much discussed in contemporary logic: cf. Hintikka 1973 (an early information 
view of logic), Abramsky 2007 (on similar issues in the foundations of computation), 
van Benthem & Martinez 2007, and van Benthem & Velazquez-Quesada 2009 for some 
current takes that have immediate relevance to scientific reasoning in general. 
 
Further attitudes, other informational actions Very typical for logics of agency is the 
wider  spectrum  of  attitudes  that  agents  can  have  toward  information,  ranging  from 
                                                 
26 To use a not wholly serious linguistic argument: the very term “research” sounds dynamic to me, and it 
is much richer than its ‘products’ of immutable knowledge and fixed theories. The heart of science seems 
to lie in its modus operandi: the processes that generate its products, not a museum of ‘certified theories’. 
27 Newton’s Principia Mathematica seems to have mainly mathematical axioms, but read his Optics, and 
you will see that experiments, i.e., the voice of Nature speaking, are treated with equal importance.   13   
knowledge and belief to many others, such as neutral ‘entertainment’, and even doubt. 
My colleague Peter Wesly used to make the same point about scientific activity in the 
1970s: science consists not just of what we know, but also of what researchers believe, 
and even more generally, what we currently ‘entertain’. I would also think that we need 
a much richer view of what a scientific theory is in terms of surrounding cognitive 
attitudes,  starting  with  beliefs 
28,  since,  as  Popper  pointed  out  so  correctly,  rational 
belief revision as an engine of learning seems at least as essential to understanding 
science as peaceful accumulation and regurgitation of knowledge. And even more than 
that, there is also the research agenda as an object in its own right. What Lakatos and 
others  have  said  about that  fits  very  well  with  current logical  interest in questions, 
issues, and agenda dynamics (Girard 2008, van Benthem & Minica 2009). 
29 
 
Longer term dynamics of information flow Most of what I have mentioned so far is 
‘local dynamics’ in the sense of single steps of information update, belief revision, or 
learning, and single questions and steps of agenda change. But science is also a long-
term  process  with  features  that  only  emerge  in  the  long  run.  Thus,  dynamic  logics 
interface naturally with temporal logics of agency, that can also deal with long-term 
features of histories, as well as ‘protocols’ regulating feasible or admissible ways of 
obtaining evidence. This is also the perspective of formal learning theory as applied to 
the philosophy of science (cf. Kelly 1996), and attempts are under way to merge the 
logical and learning-theoretical perspectives (Dégrémont & Gierasimczuk 2009). 
 
 ‘The others’: social aspects of science revisited One essential source of information 
mentioned by the earliest logicians was communication, given that the discipline of 
logic arose in a setting of conversation and argumentation with more than one agent. 
But likewise, science essentially involves different agents. Indeed, various authors have 
cast empirical inquiry in terms of games played by ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ (Giles 1974, 
                                                 
28 Van Benthem 2007, Baltag & Smets 2008B give complete dynamic logics for steps of belief revision. 
Van Benthem 2009 explores belief revision even for purely deductive mathematical theories. 
29 Indeed, I now think that the earlier emphasis on non-monotonic consequence relations, both in common 
sense and science, is mistaken. The essential process to understand is the formation and modification of 
beliefs, and non-monotonic features dissolve then into a dynamic logic of belief revision or learning on a 
classical underlying logic. Van Benthem 2008 has details, and shows how this ‘deconstructs’ ‘logical 
pluralism’, and McCarthy’s achievements in AI. A similar shift, away from non-classical ‘quantum logic’ 
to dynamic logic of measurement actions on a classical base occurs in Baltag & Smets 2008A.   14   
Hintikka 1973, Lorenz & Lorenzen 1978, Mittelstaedt 1978). But communication and 
debate between human agents also seems essential to science: after all, one of the most 
successful social inventions ever. Indeed its internal styles of debate seem one of its 
main engines of progress. In logic, active contacts with game theory are developing 
these  days  (van  Benthem  1999,  de  Bruin  2004,  Baltag,  Smets  &  Zvesper  2009, 
Dégrémont & Roy 2009). In the philosophy of science, interfaces have developed more 
in the area of evolutionary games (Skyrms 1990). Like computer science, game theory 
might become one point where logic and philosophy of science meet once more.  
 
But  there  is  even  more  to  this  ‘social  aspect’  of  science  than  mere  interaction  of 
individuals. Scientific theories are usually community creations, and their development 
tends to be a group activity. But if that is so, we also need to take a further step also 
visible in logic today, viz. the study of groups as epistemic actors that are sui generis, 
and the way groups can form and evolve, along with their beliefs and actions. 
 
Science and values Finally, one crucial aspect about agency is this. Alongside with the 
dynamics of information flow, there is a second major cognitive system permeating all 
rational action, viz. the dynamics of evaluation. Everything we say and do is coloured, 
and often driven, by the way we evaluate situations, and set goals accordingly. Indeed, 
we would not even call a decision or an action ‘rational’ if it lacks the proper balance 
between available information and desire. And this evaluational system is dynamic, too: 
our  preferences can change  over  time, and  they  interact  with  available  information. 
Now, for science, it has often been stated that it is ‘value-neutral’, and one should stick 
to the mere informational facts. Is that so? Or are we missing a crucial aspects of the 
scientific activity by ignoring its goals, perhaps even, its changing goals over time? 
 
A research program Clearly, this section has only lightly raised a lot of different issues. 
But there is a serious general program behind the examples that I would advocate here, 
which seems highly promising to me. I propose taking a systematic second look at all 
traditional issues in the philosophy of science from the perspective of current dynamic 
epistemic  logics  that  describe  events  of  observation  producing  new  information.  It 
seems to me that much more of what makes science tick will come to light that way. 
 
 
   15   
5  Conclusions 
 
Logic and the philosophy of science share a long contiguous history, and it is often hard 
to say where one stops and the other starts, both in themes and in persons. 
30 Still, the 
two areas have drifted apart for some decades. Are there irreconcilable differences?  
 
Structure, or language, or both We have seen some typical features of the logician’s 
modus operandi that might seem strange to philosophers of science (they certainly are 
alien to most practicing scientists): the use of formal languages, the search for complete 
formal systems, and the development of a meta-theory whose results are relative to 
features of formalization. Dependence on linguistic formulation is usually considered a 
flaw  by  philosophers  of  science. 
31  Personally,  I  consider  such  polemics  fruitless. 
‘Language focus’ is a natural dual stance to structural semantic approaches to scientific 
activity, and it forms a natural complement to studies in the philosophy of science. Even 
more strongly, without proper attention to linguistic code, we cannot even make sense 
of the crucial computational aspect of science, which operates on symbols, not models.  
 
I am a bit ambivalent, however, about the form this language awareness should take. 
The  logician’s  complete  formal  systems  are  whole  packages  that  might  serve  as 
eventual replacement of scientific activity. But this misses one of the most intriguing 
features of science: its ability to create new notions and new notations and then insert 
these  into  existing  reasoning  practice.  The  result  is  an  evolving  mixture  of  natural 
language and common sense practices with new notations and styles of proof. And it is 
this mixture, not some projection into pure common sense or mathematics components, 
that forms the success of the enterprise. Maybe we should all adjust our focus to get a 
better grasp of this phenomenon, that keeps science a part of our culture and life. 
 
From static structure to science as dynamic social agency In line with this, I have said 
that we should look at science from the perspective of dynamic logics of agency. Part of 
this is still close to the tradition, viz. an emphasis on the information dynamics that 
drives scientists. But there is also the social aspect of different agents cooperating, and 
in the case of science, often also competing, deploying a host of different strategies. 
                                                 
30  My  chapter  van  Benthem  2006  in  the  Handbook  of  the  Philosophy  of  Logic  gives  many  further 
illustrations of these contacts, including topics like causality and probability. 
31 Cf. the spectre of ‘dependence on translation’ in the study of verisimilitude: Miller 1974.   16   
Now to many colleagues, science arises precisely by abstracting from this social aspect 
of the common sense world, and downplaying it. And so, radical critics like Kuhn and 
diehard logical positivists found themselves on the same side of a divide: logic has 
nothing to do with social activities. To me, this seems deeply mistaken. Despite the 
ubiquitous rhetoric of lonely scientists communicating directly with God, science is a 
major case of a successful social enterprise, with remarkable historical cohesion (longer 
than  that  of  any  current  empire  or  religion)  based  on  rational  cooperation  and 
competition. And for logics of agency, precisely the latter is the primary concern. 
 
Indeed Kuhn’s own work is a good example. It famously distinguished between ‘normal 
science’ and ‘scientific revolutions’. But this is not a reason for breaking with logic: it 
is rather an intriguing shared theme with modern logic. Normal science is about the 
constant stream of small adjustments that we make to our knowledge and beliefs under 
information flow, while keeping background theory and conceptual framework fixed. 
But there is also the more radical form of belief revision, where amongst other things, 
the very language that we couched our knowledge and beliefs in gets changed. While 
there is not much logical work on this yet (cf. Rott 2007, van Benthem 2010 for a few 
thoughts), I would definitely consider language and framework change as logical topics. 
They are not reasons for leaving logic, taking them seriously rather calls for more logic. 
 
And when all is said and done, I find that even the staunchest logical philosophers of an 
earlier era admit this point. Carnap and Nagel said that the main function of science is 
to make things objective by making them intersubjective. But what is intersubjectivity, 
if not a virtue that gets created, honed, and maintained through rational interaction? 
32 
 
In the past, logic has often been held up to philosophers of science, sometimes in a 
condescending manner, as a field that they should respect, apply, and emulate in its 
superior rigour and depth. Even philosophers of science like Carnap sometimes gush 
about the depth of logicians, the way they also wax ecstatic about the rationality of ‘the 
                                                 
32  A  wonderful  historical  illustration  is  Staal,  to  appear,  who  shows  how  mathematical  notations 
‘democratized’ European science since the Middle Ages, allowing for larger groups to get involved in 
assessing arguments, and finding new ones. On this view, the difference with science in other cultures 
was not greater intellect, or greater curiosity, but greater participation. While this is not the only cause 
(cf. Huff 1993 for social dimensions such as legal stability), it is worth seeing that formalization is not 
‘abstraction away from the world’ (cf. Barendregt 2008) but the opposite: an increase in intersubjectivity.   17   
scientist’ – conveniently disregarding the negative features of actual specimens. I may 
have sounded a similar note at times, but then unintentionally. I do think that academic 
fields only cooperate well when there is intellectual symmetry. And in any case, what I 
would  like  to  bring  to  the  encounter  is  not  preaching  particular  logical  notions  or 
insights that need to be digested, admired, and then incorporated. I would rather like to 
convey the playful aspect of logic as a way of thinking about rational cognitive activity, 
the way creative logicians play with their themes and results, rather than preach them. 
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